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2017 Bench Memorandum* 
 
 
I. REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK. 
A. PARTIES. 
Cordelia Lear (Cordelia or Lear1) is an individual living on 
Lear Island, which is located in Brittain County in the State of New 
Union.  She is the daughter of King James Lear and the sister of 
Goneril Lear and Regan Lear.  She is also the descendent of Cor-
nelius Lear, who received Lear Island via congressional grant in 
1803.  Upon her father’s death in 2005, she came into possession of 
an undeveloped 10-acre lot on Lear Island called the “Cordelia Lot” 
or “the Heath.”  Cordelia proposes to construct a home on her lot, 
but the vast majority of the Heath has been designated a critical 
habitat for the Karner Blue Butterfly, an endangered species. 
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is a 
federal agency within the U.S. Department of the Interior respon-
sible for enforcing and administering federal wildlife laws, includ-
ing the Endangered Species Act.  Its mission is to work with others 
to conserve, protect, and enhance fish, wildlife, and plants and 
their habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people. 
 
* Please note that the Table of Contents has been omitted. 
1. All references to “Lear” are to Cordelia. Other members of the Lear family 
will be referred to by their first names or full names. 
1
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Brittain County, New Union is a local government in the 
State of New Union.  The Brittain County Wetlands Board has per-
mitting authority regarding wetlands in Brittain County, New Un-
ion.  One of the Brittain County Wetlands Board’s regulations lim-
its permits to fill wetlands to situations where the wetland would 
be filled for a water-dependent use.  Another rule conclusively es-
tablishes that a residential home site was not a water-dependent 
use. 
B. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Generally speaking, this case involves two claims: First, that 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544, is not 
a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause in article I, section 8, clause 3.  Second, that the ESA and 
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law2 together deprive 
the Cordelia Lot of all economic value, resulting in a regulatory 
taking without just compensation.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Lu-
cas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  
The second claim contains a number of sub-issues, which will be 
explained in greater detail in part V below. 
While the issues are constitutional challenges that do not turn 
on a direct application of the ESA, the ESA certainly impacts the 
outcome of those claims and so understanding how it underlies the 
litigation may be helpful.  Enacted in 1973 and amended in 1978, 
1982, and 1988,3 the ESA “is a commitment by the American peo-
ple to work together to protect and restore those species that are 
most at risk of extinction.”  EARTHJUSTICE, CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO 
 
2. Specific text of the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law has not 
been provided to the competitors.  Three important components of the Wetlands 
Preservation Law can be divined from the facts, however: (1) that a permit is re-
quired to fill wetlands falling under its jurisdiction; (2) no permit can be issued 
where the wetland would be filled for a non-water-dependent use; and (3) con-
structing a residential home is not a water-dependent use. 
 As a final point, the district court mentioned in a footnote that the Constitu-
tion of the State of New Union does not have something comparable to a Just 
Compensation Clause and that New Union does not have statutes creating a just 
compensation schema. 
3. An earlier version also existed: The Endangered Species Preservation Act 
was passed in 1966 and was amended in 1969 as the Endangered Species Conser-
vation Act. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 4 (2003).4  The ESA begins with a 
congressional finding that “various species of fish, wildlife, and 
plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a conse-
quence of economic growth and development untempered by ade-
quate concern and conservation.”  ESA § 2(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1531(a)(1). 
Under the ESA, the FWS is directed to “determine whether 
any species is an endangered species or threatened species.”  Id. 
§ 4(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).  This process is called “listing,” 
and the listed species are compiled at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2015).  
“The term ‘species’ includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife or 
plants, and any distinct population segment of any species or ver-
tebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.”  ESA 
§ 3(16), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).  An “endangered species” is “any spe-
cies which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant 
portion of its range.”  Id. § 3(6), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).5  Once the 
FWS has listed a species as endangered, it must designate a criti-
cal habitat for the species.  Id. § 4(a)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(a)(3)(A).6  The Karner Blue Butterfly was listed as endan-
gered in 1992.  50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2015); 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 
14, 1992). 
Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “take of any species within 
the United States” if the species has been listed pursuant to ESA 
§ 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533, see ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1538(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.21(c)(1).  “The term “take” means to 
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”  ESA § 2(19), 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).  “Harm in the definition of “take” in the [ESA] 
means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.  Such act may 
include significant habitat modification or degradation where it ac-
tually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”  50 
C.F.R. § 17.3.  “Harass in the definition of ‘take’ in the [ESA] means 
 
4. This document is available at: http://earthustice.org/sites/default/files/li-
brary/reports/Citizens_Guide_ESA.pdf. 
5. A “threatened species” is one “which is likely to become an endangered 
species within the foreseeable future through all or a significant portion of its 
range.”  ESA § 3(20), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). 
6. The FWS shall designate a critical habitat concurrently with the determi-
nation that the species is endangered or threatened.  ESA § 4(b)(6)(B), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(6)(B).   
3
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an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the like-
lihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to 
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, 
but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”  Id. 
ESA section 10 allows the Secretary of the Interior to “permit, 
under such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe . . . any tak-
ing otherwise prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title if such 
taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of 
an otherwise lawful activity.”  ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1539(a)(1)(B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22.  This permit is called an “inci-
dental take permit (ITP).”  No ITP shall be issued, however, unless 
the applicant submits a habitat conservation plan (HCP).  See ESA 
§ 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (requiring ITP applicant to 
submit a “conservation plan”); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (“Conser-
vation plans also are known as ‘habitat conservation plans’ or 
‘HCPs.’”).7 
Finally, ESA section 11 provides not only for civil penalties, 
but criminal prosecution as well.  ESA § 11(a)–(b), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1540(a)–(b).  “Any person who knowingly violates any provision 
of this chapter . . . shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than 
$50,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”  Id. 
§ 11(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b). 
The Commerce Clause8 gives Congress the power “to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states.”  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3.  Generally speaking, this grant of legislative power was fairly 
narrow in the 19th century, but was substantially expanded by a 
series of Supreme Court opinions in the 1930s.  Following the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 
(1942), courts undeviatingly upheld congressional enactments un-
til a pair of cases in the 1990s signaled a shift back in the opposite 
direction, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, (1995).  Since those cases, 
courts remain generally deferential to Congress’s exercise of the 
 
7. For more information about HCPs and the ESA, see FWS, Habitat Con-
servation Plans under the Endangered Species Act (2011), 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/hcp.pdf.   
8. Both the Commerce Clause and the Fifth Amendment have generated sub-
stantial bodies of case law.  This section is meant only to provide a brief introduc-
tion to and overview of those provisions.  The case law, including case law for the 
relevant sub-issues, will be discussed in greater detail in parts IV and V below. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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Commerce power, but have been more skeptical of its reach than 
in the last half-century. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, inter alia, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”9  It applies not only to physical tak-
ings and condemnations, but regulatory takings as well.  See First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S. 
304, 316 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
414–16 (1922).  Most takings claims involve a balancing of policy 
interests and ad hoc, fact-intensive inquiries.  See Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  How-
ever, some categorical rules do exist: pertinent to the instant case, 
when a government regulation totally deprives a property owner of 
all economic value of their property, a taking has occurred and the 
government must pay the property owner just compensation.  Lu-
cas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
List of Applicable Rules of Law: 
• U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 
• U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 
• U.S. CONST., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 
• U.S. CONST., Amend. V 
• U.S. CONST., Amend. X 
• U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV 
• Endangered Species Act § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012) 
• Endangered Species Act § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (2012) 
• Endangered Species Act § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012) 
• Endangered Species Act § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012) 
• Endangered Species Act § 10, 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2012) 
• Endangered Species Act § 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2012) 
• 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016) 
• 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2016) 
• 50 C.F.R. § 17.21 (2016) 
• 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2016) 
 
 
9. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated 
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  See 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
5
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Non-Binding Agency Guidelines: 
• U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK10 
C. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE. 
The undisputed facts established by the district court are as 
follows:11 
1.  Lear Island is a 1,000-acre island in Lake Union, which is 
a large interstate lake that has been traditionally used for inter-
state navigation.  Lear Island was granted to Cornelius Lear in 
1803 by an Act of Congress, when present-day New Union was part 
of the Northwest Territory.  The 1803 grant included title in fee 
simple absolute to all of Lear Island and to “all lands under water 
within a 300-foot radius of the shoreline,” as well as an additional 
grant of lands under water in the shallow strait separating Lear 
Island from the mainland. 
2.  Cornelius Lear and his descendants have occupied Lear Is-
land since the 1803 grant, using the island as a homestead, farm, 
and hunting and fishing grounds.  The original homestead is still 
located close to the north end of the island, near the strait that 
separates the island from the mainland.  When Lear Island was a 
farm in the 19th century, produce was carried by boat from the 
island to the mainland.  In the early 20th century, the Lears con-
structed a causeway connecting the island to the mainland by road. 
3.  In 1965, King James Lear owned the entirety of the 1803 
Lear Island grant.  As part of an estate plan, King James divided 
 
10. Available at https://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/per-
mits/hcp/hcphandbook.html. 
11. Although this factual summary contains all pertinent facts and proce-
dure as developed by the opinion of the district court in the course of a seven-day 
bench trial, it is condensed.  Judges and brief graders should also review the Prob-
lem.  
 Additionally, the district court opinion in the Problem used numbered para-
graphs to represent discrete factual findings following the bench trial.  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 52.  For the ease of judges and brief graders, this factual summary 
remains faithful paragraph numbering in the Problem.  Citations to the Problem 
will generally be to the page 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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Lear Island into three parcels, one for each of his daughters Gon-
eril, Regan, and Cordelia.  The Brittain Town Planning Board ap-
proved the subdivision of the property into three lots: the 550-acre 
Goneril Lot, the 440-acre Regan Lot, and the 10-acre Cordelia 
Lot.12  At the time of the subdivision, the Town Planning Board 
determined that each lot could be developed with at least one sin-
gle-family residence.  King James then deeded each of the lots, re-
spectively, to his three daughters, reserving a life estate in each lot 
for himself.  He continued to live in the homestead, located on the 
Goneril Lot. 
4.  King James Lear died in 2005, and each of the three daugh-
ters came into possession of their deeded lots.  In 2012, Plaintiff 
Cordelia Lear decided to build a residence on her lot. 
5.  The Cordelia Lot is situated at the northern tip of Lear Is-
land.  The lot consists of an access strip that is 40 feet wide by 1,000 
feet long, and an open field that comprises the remaining nine 
acres of uplands.  In addition, there is about one acre of emergent 
cattail marsh in a cove that historically was open water and was 
historically used as a boat landing. 
6.  The 9-acre open field and access strip has been kept open 
by annual mowing in October by the Lear Family for several dec-
ades.  The family has referred to the Cordelia Lot as “The Heath” 
because it was kept open, unlike the rest of the island, which nat-
urally became wooded after agricultural use of the island ceased in 
1965. 
7.  The Heath and the access strip are covered with wild blue 
lupine flowers, which thrive in the sandy soil of Lear Island.  Fields 
of wild blue lupines are essential for the survival of Karner Blue 
larvae, which can only feed on the leaves of blue lupine plants.  The 
ideal habitat for the Karner Blues consists of partially shaded lu-
pine flowers near successional forests. 
8.  The Karner Blue is an endangered species.  50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.11 (2015).  It was added to the federal endangered species list 
on December 14, 1992.  57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992). 
9.  Although populations of Karner Blues survive in other 
states, the only remaining population of the butterfly in New Un-
ion lives on the Heath on Lear Island.  Karner Blues do not mi-
grate.  Instead, eggs are laid in the fall, overwinter, and hatch in 
 
12. The acreage figures do not include deeded lands underwater. 
7
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the spring.  A second brood hatches in the summer.  Karner Blue 
larvae remain attached to lupine plant foliage until they emerge 
from chrysalis as butterflies, and any disturbance of the lupines 
during the larval and chrysalis stages would result in the death of 
the butterflies.  Karner Blue populations have difficulty migrating 
to new habitats as their flight distance is short, and they must fol-
low woodland edge corridors.  The New Union subpopulation of 
Karner Blue is entirely intrastate and does not travel across any 
State boundaries. 
10.  The Heath was designated by the FWS as critical habitat 
for the New Union subpopulation of the Karner Blues in 1992. 
11.  In April 2012, Cordelia Lear contacted the New Union 
FWS field office to inquire whether development of her property 
would require any permits or approvals because of the existence of 
the endangered butterfly population.  FWS agent L.E. Pidopter ad-
vised her that any disturbance of the lupine habitat in the Heath 
other than continued annual mowing would constitute a “take” of 
the endangered butterfly.  Pidopter also advised Lear that it was 
possible to obtain an Incidental Take Permit (“ITP”) under ESA 
§ 10, but in order to file an application for such a permit, Lear 
would have to develop a habitat conservation plan (“HCP”) for the 
Karner Blues and an environmental assessment document under 
the National Environmental Policy Act.  Pidopter advised Ms. Lear 
that in order to be approvable, an HCP would have to provide for 
additional contiguous lupine habitat on an acre-for-acre basis, in-
cluding any disturbance of the access strip.  Pidopter also advised 
that an approvable HCP would require a commitment to maintain 
the remaining lupine fields through annual fall mowing. 
12.  The only land that is contiguous to the Heath is the Gon-
eril Lot.  Cordelia is estranged from her sister, and Goneril has 
refused to cooperate in any HCP that involves restrictions on her 
property. 
13.  Lear investigated the cost of preparing the required HCP 
for the Karner Blues, and was advised by an environmental con-
sultant that preparation of an application for an ITP, including the 
required HCP and environmental assessment documents, would 
cost $150,000. 
14.  Following Cordelia Lear’s inquiry to the FWS, the FWS 
New Union field office sent Cordelia Lear a letter on May 15, 2012 
confirming that her entire ten-acre property was a critical habitat 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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for the Karner Blues and that any disturbance to the lupine fields 
other than annual October mowing would constitute a “take” of the 
Karner Blues in violation of ESA § 9.  The letter invited Lear to 
submit an ITP application and referred her to the FWS’s Habitat 
Conservation Planning Handbook for information on how to de-
velop an acceptable HCP to submit with an ITP application.  The 
FWS letter reiterated that an acceptable HCP would require, at a 
minimum, that all acreage of lupine field disturbed by develop-
ment would have to be replaced with contiguous acreage, and that 
Lear would have to commit to maintain the remaining and newly 
created lupine fields by annual mowing each October. 
15.  Without annual mowing, the lupine fields on the Cordelia 
Lot would naturally convert to a successional forest of oak and 
hickory trees, eliminating the Karner Blues’ habitat.  This process 
would take about ten years.  After ten years, this natural ecological 
process would result in the extinction of the New Union subpopu-
lation of the Karner Blues, unless a replacement habitat was cre-
ated within a one-thousand-foot radius of the existing fields. 
16.  Rather than pursue an ITP application with the FWS, 
Plaintiff developed an alternative development proposal (“ADP”) 
that would not disturb the lupine fields.  In the ADP, Lear proposed 
to fill one half-acre of the marsh in the cove to create a lupine-free 
building site, together with a causeway for access from the shared 
mainland causeway without disturbing the access strip.  As the 
Army Corps of Engineers considers this portion of Lake Union to 
be “non-navigable” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899, and because construction of residential dwellings involving 
one half-acre or less of fill is authorized by Army Corps of Engi-
neers Nationwide Permit 29, see Issuance of Nationwide Permit for 
Single-Family Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 (July 27, 1995), no fed-
eral approvals would be needed for the ADP. 
17.  The ADP required a permit to fill the cove marsh, pursu-
ant to the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law, which was 
enacted in 1982.  In August 2013, Lear duly filed a permit applica-
tion with the Brittain County Wetlands Board.  The permit was 
denied in December 2013, on the grounds that permits to fill wet-
lands would only be granted for a water-dependent use, and that a 
residential home site was not a water-dependent use. 
18.  The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot without any re-
strictions that would prevent development of a single-family house 
9
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on the lot is $100,000.  Property taxes on the Cordelia Lot are 
$1,500 annually.  There is no market in Brittain County for a par-
cel such as the Cordelia Lot for recreational use without the right 
to develop a residence on the property, nor does the property have 
any market in its current state as agricultural or timber land.  Lear 
has not sought reassessment of her property following the denial 
of the permit under the Brittain County Wetland Preservation 
Law.  The Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay Cor-
delia Lear $1,000 annually for the privilege of conducting butterfly 
viewing outings during the summer Karner Blue season, but she 
rejected the Society’s offer. 
19.  Plaintiff then commenced this action in February 2014, 
seeking a declaration that the ESA was an unconstitutional exer-
cise of congressional legislative power, or alternatively, seeking 
just compensation from FWS and Brittain County for a regulatory 
taking of her property. 
On June 1, 2016, the District Court for the District of New Un-
ion entered judgment following a seven-day bench trial.  The court 
determined that the ESA is a legitimate exercise of congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause, as applied to a wholly intra-
state population of Karner Blue Butterfly.  Next, the district court 
determined that the combined effect of the ESA and the Brittain 
County Wetlands Preservation Law totally deprived the Cordelia 
Lot of all economic value, resulting in a taking under Lucas.  In 
making this second determination, the district court also deter-
mined that Lear’s claim was ripe notwithstanding the fact that 
Lear did not apply for an ITP; that the relevant parcel of land for 
Lear’s takings claim was the Cordelia Lot, not the entirety of Lear 
Island; that the fact that the Cordelia Lot could become developa-
ble in 10 years if the Karner Blue habitat was destroyed naturally 
through successional afforestation and non-mowing did not defeat 
Lear’s takings claim; that the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s 
offer to pay $1,000 annually in rent for wildlife viewing did not 
preclude Lear’s takings claim based on a total deprivation of eco-
nomic value; and that the public trust doctrine does not inhere in 
Lear’s title and does not preclude Lear’s takings claim.  Accord-
ingly, the district court awarded Lear $90,000 in damages against 
Brittain County and $10,000 in damages against FWS. 
FWS, Lear, and Brittain County all filed timely notices of ap-
peal filed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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Circuit.  FWS and Brittain County filed Notices of Appeal on June 
9, 2016, and Lear filed a Notice of Appeal on June 10, 2016.  The 
Twelfth Circuit has already decided that it has jurisdiction of this 
appeal.13 
II. ISSUES. 
• Whether the ESA a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce 
power, as applied to a wholly intrastate population of an 
endangered butterfly that would be eliminated by construc-
tion of a single-family residence for personal use? 
o On appeal, Lear and Brittain County will argue 
the ESA is not a valid exercise of the Commerce 
power. 
o On appeal, FWS will argue the ESA is a valid use of 
Congress’s Commerce power because the relevant 
activity is constructing a house, which is plainly eco-
nomic activity with the potential in aggregate of a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
 
13. Generally speaking, a statute governing claims against the United 
States—called the “Tucker Act”—places original jurisdiction of a claim for dam-
ages against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1491(a)(1). There is a corollary statute, however—the “Little Tucker Act”—that 
permits other district courts to have jurisdiction of claims against the United 
States if the claim is for less than $10,000.  See id. § 1346(a)(2).  One way a plain-
tiff may avoid the Court of Federal Claims, should they desire to do so, is to waive 
damages against the United States in excess of $10,000.  See Chabal v. Reagan, 
822 F.2d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 1987); Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 F.2d 1351, 1356 (8th Cir. 
1986); Goble v. Marsh, 684 F.2d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  In such a case, the Fed-
eral Circuit may have appellate jurisdiction under some circumstances, although 
courts of appeal have been reluctant to give up jurisdiction of a case.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295; Chabal, 822 F.2d at 353. 
 Here, Lear waived damages in excess of $10,000 against the FWS and United 
States, but did not waive damages in excess of that amount against Brittain 
County.  Accordingly, district court jurisdiction was proper.  Further, applying 
considerations in Chabal, the Twelfth Circuit likely has jurisdiction as well.  
However, to avoid an issue of which court of appeals has jurisdiction to 
hear this case, competitors were directed to assume the Twelfth Circuit 
had already determined that it, and not the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, has jurisdiction of this matter.  It is therefore expected that 
neither district court jurisdiction nor appellate court jurisdiction 
should be an issue that is either briefed or argued. 
11
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• Whether Lear’s takings claim against FWS ripe without 
having applied for an ITP under ESA § 10(a)(1)(B), 16 
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)? 
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue Lear’s 
claim is not ripe since she did not apply for an ITP. 
o On appeal, Lear will argue her claim is ripe even 
though she did not apply for an ITP. 
• Whether, for Lear’s takings claim, the relevant parcel is the 
entirety of Lear Island, or merely the Cordelia Lot as sub-
divided in 1965? 
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue the 
entire island is the relevant parcel. 
o On appeal, Lear argues the Cordelia Lot is. 
• Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the 
fact that the lot will become developable upon the natural 
destruction of the butterfly habitat in ten years shield the 
FWS and Brittain County from a takings claim based upon 
a complete deprivation of economic value of the property? 
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue the 
butterfly habitat’s natural destruction in the future 
precludes Lear’s takings claim. 
o On appeal, Lear argues it does not. 
• Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, do public 
trust principles inherent in title preclude Lear’s claim for a 
taking based on the denial of a county wetlands permit? 
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue public 
trust principles preclude Lear’s takings claim. 
o On appeal, Lear argues they do not. 
• Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, are FWS 
and Brittain County liable for a complete deprivation of the 
economic value of the Cordelia Lot when either the federal 
or county regulation, by itself, would still allow develop-
ment of a single-family residence? 
o On appeal, Lear argues that even though the regu-
lations would not individually amount to a taking 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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under Lucas, the ESA and the Brittain County Wet-
lands Preservation Law together completely deprive 
the Cordelia Lot of all economic value. 
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue that 
the ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preser-
vation Law must be considered separately and thus 
do not completely deprive the Cordelia Lot of all eco-
nomic value. 
• Assuming the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot, does the 
Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 per 
year in rent for wildlife viewing preclude a takings claim for 
complete loss of economic value? 
o On appeal, FWS and Brittain County argue it 
does. 
o On appeal, Lear argues it does not. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
United States courts of appeal “shall have jurisdiction of ap-
peals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291.14  Generally speaking, where the district 
court has made factual findings following a bench trial, an appel-
late court will not set those findings aside unless they are “clearly 
erroneous.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, 
Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2004).  In contrast, a district 
court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  Chandler v. City 
of Dallas, 958 F.2d 85, 89 (5th Cir. 1992).  A district court’s appli-
cation of law to fact is also reviewed de novo.  See Cree v. Flores, 
157 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 1998). 
IV. COMMERCE CLAUSE:  
Is the ESA a valid exercise of the Commerce power? 
In the district court, Lear sought a declaration that the ESA 
is not a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce power 
when applied to a wholly intrastate population of an endangered 
species.  Brittain County agreed with Lear in the district court.  
 
14. See note 13, supra.  
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FWS resisted, arguing that the ESA substantially affects inter-
state commerce, particularly in situations like the present one, 
where commercial activity—constructing a residence; developing 
land; hiring contractors; and purchasing materials—threatens an 
endangered species.  The district court agreed.  The ESA is proba-
bly a constitutional exercise of the Commerce power, but Lear and 
Brittain County have several strong arguments. 
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution 
gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce . . . among the 
several states.”  Generally speaking, the Commerce power permits 
regulation of the instrumentalities and channels of interstate com-
merce.  Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005).  Additionally, 
and pertinent to this case, the Commerce power also extends to 
wholly intrastate activities that have a “close and substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appro-
priate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”  
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).  Even 
intrastate activities that would have a trivial effect, let alone a sub-
stantial effect, on interstate commerce may be regulated if their 
effect on interstate commerce, in the aggregate, would be substan-
tial.  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
However, the Supreme Court clarified in United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000), that the activity must still be economic in nature.  In 
Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
(GFSZA), which made possession of a firearm within a certain dis-
tance of a school.  See 514 U.S. at 561.  In Morrison, the Court 
struck down the Violence Against Women Act, which made certain 
gender-motivated acts of violence a federal crime.  See 529 U.S. at 
617.  Morrison synthesized four factors considered in Lopez: 
• First, the GFSZA, which Lopez struck down, was “‘a crimi-
nal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with “com-
merce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly 
one might define those terms.’”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
• Second, the GFSZA “contained ‘no express jurisdictional el-
ement which might limit its reach to a discrete set of fire-
arm possessions that additionally have an explicit connec-
tion with or effect on interstate commerce.’”  Id. at 611–12 
(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562). 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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• Third, neither the GFSZA “‘nor its legislative history con-
tain express congressional findings regarding the effects 
upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school 
zone.’”  Id. at 612 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562). 
• Fourth, “Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link be-
tween gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce was attenuated.”  Id. at 612. 
The Lopez and Morrison Courts both clarified that the second 
and third factors—a jurisdictional element in the statute and find-
ings regarding the effects on interstate commerce of the regulated 
activity—are not absolute requirements, but instead are factors to 
be considered as part of the whole inquiry. 
Initially, FWS will likely argue that nearly every court to con-
sider whether the ESA is constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause has concluded ESA is constitutional.  See, e.g., San Luis & 
Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 
F.3d 1250, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 
F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. 
Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640–41 (5th Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 
F.3d 483, 505–06 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. 
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997).15  These cases up-
hold the ESA as applied to some strikingly local species: for exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ESA in the context of “six species 
of subterranean invertebrates found only within two counties in 
Texas.”  GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 624.  The Eleventh Circuit re-
jected a challenge to the ESA’s protection of the “Alabama stur-
geon[, which] is a purely intrastate species with little, if any, com-
mercial value, as evidenced by the fact that there have been no 
reported commercial harvests of the fish in more than a century.”  
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1271.  National 
Ass’n of Home Builders affirmed the constitutionality of the ESA 
 
15. FWS may also argue that the ESA has been before the Supreme Court 
several times, and the Court has never questioned its constitutionality.  See Ben-
nett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).  Lear 
and Brittain County can respond that judicial minimalism is precisely a goal that 
the Court should strive for; so it would be inappropriate to rely on that consider-
ation here.  But see Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1272 (consider-
ing the fact that the Supreme Court has not mentioned the constitutionality of 
the ESA in other cases).  
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with respect to a fly that lived in an 8-mile radius in California.  
See 130 F.3d at 1043.  Moreover, most of these cases were decided 
after Lopez and Morrison.  Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition, 
for example, included a thorough discussion of Lopez and Morrison.  
See 477 F.3d at 1271–72.  San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Au-
thority explicitly recognized that Lopez and Morrison set forth the 
controlling test for whether a statute is a constitutional exercise of 
the Commerce power.  See 638 F.3d at 1174. 
In contrast, Lear and Brittain County will argue that none 
of those cases are binding on the Twelfth Circuit and that People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wild-
life Serv. (PETPO), 57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1344–46 (D. Utah 2014), 
which held the ESA could not constitutionally be applied to takes 
of Utah prairie dogs, is more persuasive.  The PETPO court rea-
soned an ESA rule regarding the take of Utah prairie dogs was 
unconstitutional because it did not regulate an economic activity.  
Id. at 1344.  Like the Karner Blue, they will argue, the effect of the 
Utah Prairie dog on interstate commerce was attenuated; that the 
ESA affected commerce by frustrating agricultural or commercial 
development was not relevant to the Commerce Clause inquiry—
whether a take of an intrastate endangered species like the Utah 
prairie dog was.  Id.  “In other words, the question in the present 
case is whether take of the Utah prairie dog has a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce, not whether the regulation preventing the 
take has such an effect.”  Id.  FWS will reply that PETPO is a sin-
gular outlier, but Brittain County and Lear can also point to a 
dissent written by then-Circuit Judge John Roberts in a denial of 
a petition for rehearing en banc in Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 
334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam).  Like the PETPO 
court, Judge Roberts argued that the central inquiry is not whether 
the regulation substantially impacts interstate commerce, but 
whether the regulated activity does.  Id. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dis-
senting).  Viewing the ESA in the proper light, they will argue, its 
constitutionality is in serious doubt. 
FWS should counter that the Court’s recent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has language suggesting that the dispositive issue 
is whether the regulation itself bears a significant relationship to 
interstate commerce.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (“‘[W]here a gen-
eral regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to com-
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/2
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merce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising un-
der that statute is of no consequence.’” (Quoting Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968))).  In addition, Raich stressed 
that Congress has the “power to regulate purely local activities 
that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.”  545 U.S. at 17 (quoting 
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971)) (emphasis added).  
Raich elaborated on this formulation: “That the regulation en-
snares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.  As we have 
done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components 
of that larger scheme.”  Id. at 22.  Moreover, the Court emphasized 
that it need not determine whether regulated “activities, taken in 
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but 
only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”  Id.  Lear 
and Brittain County can maintain that those are the very cases 
limiting the Commerce power, and, more importantly, Raich up-
held the regulation at issue—a criminal prohibition on the posses-
sion of marijuana—precisely because a market, albeit an illegal 
one, existed. 
FWS will stress that “economic activity must be understood in 
broad terms.”  Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491.  Consequently, FWS will 
likely argue that even if the relevant activity is not a plainly com-
mercial activity like constructing a residence, biodiversity is itself 
an inherently valuable commercial resource worth protecting.  See 
id. at 496–97.  More to the point, biodiversity and the loss of biodi-
versity have serious economic impacts.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders, 130 F.3d at 1053–54 (“In the aggregate . . . we can be cer-
tain that the extinction of species and the attendant decline in bi-
odiversity will have a real and predictable effect on interstate com-
merce.”).  Under this formulation, FWS can argue that the ESA 
can be justified vis-à-vis the regulated activity of taking an intra-
state endangered species.  Lear and Brittain County can re-
spond that, as with frustrating commercial or agricultural devel-
opment, the effect on commerce of taking an intrastate endangered 
species is attenuated.  As the PETPO court and a dissent in Na-
tional Ass’n of Home Builders reasoned, “‘the Commerce Clause 
empowers Congress “to regulate commerce” not “ecosystems.”‘“  See 
PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Build-
ers, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).  Further, as with 
the education system in Lopez, if regulations can be justified by the 
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impact of regulated activities on biodiversity, there may be no limit 
to the Commerce Clause’s reach.  PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–
45; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565–66. 
As a related argument, FWS may argue that the ESA as ap-
plied to Karner Blues can be justified because of possible future 
effects on interstate commerce by Karner Blues.  See Gibbs, 214 
F.3d at 496–97; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054; 
Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land and Nat. Resources, 471 F. Supp. 
985 (D. Haw.1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).  In fact, leg-
islative history of the ESA recognizes that because extinction is a 
one-way street, extinction can have a serious future effect on com-
merce: 
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other 
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of 
plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed?  More 
to the point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential 
cures by eliminating those plants for all time?  Sheer self interest 
impels us to be cautious. 
H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4–5 (1973).  Similarly, the Senate Re-
port to a precursor the ESA stated: “Potentially more important, 
however, is the fact that with each species we eliminate, we reduce 
the [genetic] pool . . . available for use by man in future years.”  S. 
Rep. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969).  Lear and Brittain County can reply 
that since Lopez and Morrison, not only did PETPO reject this ar-
gument, but so did the Fifth Circuit in a case in which it otherwise 
affirmed the constitutionality of the ESA.  See GDF Realty, 326 
F.3d at 638 (“The possibility of future substantial effects of the 
Cave Species on interstate commerce, through industries such as 
medicine, is simply too hypothetical and attenuated from the reg-
ulation in question to pass constitutional muster.”).  They will 
stress that the attenuation of the link between the regulated activ-
ity and its impact on interstate commerce matters, perhaps more 
than the other factors, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612; Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 562, and the connection between a wholly intrastate sub-
population of an insect species (with no commercial value other 
than a miniscule amount to be paid in rent for wildlife viewing) 
and imagined future impacts on interstate commerce is simply too 
tenuous. 
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Turning to other factors identified in Morrison, FWS should 
point out that section 2 of the ESA speaks in direct terms about the 
relationship between the ESA and commerce.  See ESA § 2(a)(1), 
16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (“The Congress finds and declares that . . . 
various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United 
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic 
growth and development untempered by adequate concern and 
conservation.”).  In addition, the ESA does not just prohibit takes 
in a general sense, but also specifically forbids the importation, 
shipment, delivery, sale, or offer for sale of endangered species in 
interstate or foreign commerce.  See id. § 9(a)(1)(A),(D),(E),(F), 16 
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A),(D),(E),(F).  These are not only economic ac-
tivities, they appear to be limited in some circumstances to inter-
state commerce.  See id.  Further, the FWS should point out that 
there is in fact some evidence in the record regarding the economic 
impact of these Karner Blues; the Brittain County Butterfly Soci-
ety has offered to pay Lear $1,000 annually as rent for wildlife 
viewing.  See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492–93 (discussing red wolf-re-
lated tourism).  Lear and Brittain County will likely respond to 
the last point by pointing that isolated tourism is not tantamount 
to a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  See PETPO, 57 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1344.  They should also point out that section 11 of the 
ESA allows for criminal prosecution, ESA § 11(b), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1540(b), and that there are no express congressional findings re-
garding the impact of Karner Blues on interstate commerce, see 
PETPO, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.  FWS should reply, however, that 
the Supreme Court has certainly upheld criminal statutes from 
Commerce Clause challenges.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 29. 
Lear and Brittain County may analogize this case to Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 172–74 (2001).  Like this case, 
SWANCC dealt with the reach of an environmental regulation—
the Army Corps of Engineers’ Migratory Bird Rule regarding the 
jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act for dredge and fill per-
mitting purposes—after Lopez and Morrison.  The Supreme Court 
explained that “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a stat-
ute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear 
indication that Congress intended that result.”  Id. at 172.  “Thus, 
‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would 
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
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statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly 
contrary to the intent of Congress.’”  Id. at 173 (quoting Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).  Here, Brittain County and 
Lear can argue that the case for the constitutionality of the Migra-
tory Bird Rule is stronger than applying the ESA to the intrastate 
population of Karner Blues: the birds in SWANCC actually trav-
elled across state lines, whereas the Karner Blues in this case do 
not; and “millions of people spend billions of dollars annually on 
recreational pursuits relating to migratory birds,” whereas the 
Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay only $1,000 
per year as rent for viewing the Karner Blues.  Furthermore, while 
the ESA take provision may mention interstate commerce in some 
cases, see ESA § 9(a)(1)(E)–(F), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(E)–(F), it 
does not in the general take provision, see id. § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1538(a)(1)(B). 
However, FWS can make arguments to distinguish SWANCC: 
First, since SWANCC was ultimately not decided on constitutional 
grounds but administrative procedure grounds—the court held 
that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeded statutory authority under 
the Clean Water Act—and since Lear did not bring her claim under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, SWANCC is inapposite.  Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court rejected an Administrative Procedure Act 
challenge to a broad interpretation of the definition of “harm” in 
ESA section 9 that includes “significant habitat modification or 
degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife.”  Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 
708 (1995).  More importantly, however, FWS can point out that 
the Clean Water Act’s findings do not mention commerce, see Clean 
Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, but the ESA’s findings do.  See 
ESA § 2(a)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(a)(1). 
FWS may also argue that the ESA need not only be found con-
stitutional because it substantially affects interstate commerce—
the endangered species themselves can be viewed as “channels” of 
interstate commerce like goods.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 
130 F.3d at 1046–48.  In this regard, Congress may regulate intra-
state takes of endangered species to “aid the prohibitions in the 
ESA on transporting and selling endangered species in interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 1047; see also United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 
948, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a post-Lopez challenge to statute 
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criminalizing the possession of machine guns “because [the stat-
ute] is ‘an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a 
commodity through the channels of commerce’” (quoting Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 559)).  Additionally, the ESA can be justified as a part of 
“‘the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate com-
merce free from immoral and injurious uses.’”  Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders, 130 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)).  Lear can reply that more 
recent cases have not adopted this position, apparently resisting 
the idea that the endangered species are goods to be transported 
or sold interstate commerce.  See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491.  Further, 
the Heart of Atlanta rationale may in fact be more appropriately 
considered as related to Congress’s power to regulate activities 
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  See Rancho 
Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1076 n.19 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly referred 
to Heart of Atlanta . . .  as also falling within the third category—
the regulation of activities having a substantial relation to inter-
state commerce.” (Citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610; Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 559)). 
Finally, the parties may make two other constitutional argu-
ments that are not reflected in the district court opinion.  First, 
FWS may argue that even if the ESA exceeds congressional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause, it is nevertheless constitu-
tional under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Con-
gress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,” including 
the Commerce Clause.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Raich, 
545 U.S. at 22.  FWS’s argument will be that the ESA is constitu-
tional with regard to the commercial activities it regulates, and 
that failing to regulate takes of endangered species that may not 
be for commercial purposes would substantially undermine the 
ESA’s effectiveness elsewhere.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 28 (“The con-
gressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant seg-
ment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement 
of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption 
of validity.”).  Indeed, Raich identified the prohibition of takes of 
bald eagles as an example of constitutional uses of the Commerce 
power when it said: “Prohibiting the intrastate possession or man-
ufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly uti-
lized) means of regulating commerce in that product.”  Id. at 26 & 
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n.36 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 668(a)).  Notably, section 668(a) prohibits, 
inter alia, the “take” of any bald eagle.  Lear and Brittain County 
will reply that PETPO is more persuasive: there is a national mar-
ket for bald eagle feathers, but, as with Utah prairie dogs, there is 
no national market for Karner Blue Butterflies.  See PETPO, 57 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1346.  Lear and Brittain County can also argue that 
taking Karner Blues, even to the point of extinction, would not sig-
nificantly affect the viability of any of predator of the Karner Blues 
that is regulated under the ESA.  See id. 
Second, Brittain County may argue that the ESA unduly in-
trudes upon the State authority protected by the Tenth Amend-
ment.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1992).  
Lear may also make a Tenth Amendment argument: under Bond 
v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 225–26 (2011), a private person—
and not just a State—may assert violations of the Tenth Amend-
ment.  Under this line of argument, management and conservation 
of a wholly intrastate subpopulation of a species for which there is 
no interstate market is a matter that should be regarded as within 
the sphere of state sovereignty.  See Baldwin v. Fish & Game 
Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 384–87 (1978).  Alternatively, 
Brittain County can argue that if the ESA regulates land clearing 
and residential construction (as FWS asserts), it intrudes on state 
power.  See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) 
(plurality opinion) (“Regulation of land use, as through the issu-
ance of the development permits . . . is a quintessential state and 
local power.”).  By intruding on these spheres, the ESA violates the 
Tenth Amendment.  FWS can reply that this is simply stating the 
inverse of Brittain County’s and Lear’s general Commerce Clause 
arguments: the Supreme Court has said that the Tenth Amend-
ment “states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered.”  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see 
also New York, 505 U.S. at 156.  Even recent opinions that have 
been more solicitous of the Tenth Amendment appear to suggest 
the Tenth Amendment is something of an equivalent check on con-
gressional power.  See Bond, 564 U.S. at 225 (“Impermissible in-
terference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated 
powers of the National Government, and action that exceeds the 
National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sover-
eign interests of States.” (Citation omitted.)).  In other words, FWS 
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would reply that while Brittain County may use the Tenth Amend-
ment to mount a different rhetorical attack, it does not substan-
tively alter the court’s analysis.  See id. at 226 (“Whether the Tenth 
Amendment is regarded as simply a ‘truism,’ or whether it has in-
dependent force of its own, the result here is the same.” (Citation 
omitted.)). 
V. TAKINGS CLAUSE: 
Do the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands Preservation 
Law combine to deprive the Cordelia lot of all economic 
value? 
In the district court, Lear argued that the ESA, together with 
the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law, totally deprived 
the Cordelia Lot of all economic value, resulting in a taking under 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).  FWS and Brittain County 
resisted, arguing that neither the ESA nor the Wetlands Preserva-
tion Law totally deprived the Cordelia Lot of all economic value.  
Additionally, they raised a number of arguments they believed pre-
cluded Lear’s takings claim.  The district court rejected their argu-
ments. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, inter alia, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”16  In general, the Takings Clause 
“bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960).  While this provision creates the power of condemnation, it 
 
16. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been incorporated 
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  See 
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). 
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on taking property for the public 
use without paying just compensation has been called both the “Just Compensa-
tion Clause,” and the “Takings Clause.”  Compare Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan-
ning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 175 (1985) (“Just 
Compensation Clause”), with E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520 (1998) (“Tak-
ings Clause”); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 n. 1 (2002) (recognizing the connection between the two 
terms).  This Bench Memo uses the term “Takings Clause” and refers to Lear’s 
claim as a “takings claim.”  However, where a title or quoted text uses the term 
“Just Compensation Clause,” this Bench Memo will not alter it. 
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has also been interpreted to prohibit “regulatory takings.”  See 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 
482 U.S. 304, 316 (1987); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–
16 (1922).  “The general rule at least is that while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”  Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.  The Supreme 
Court has “generally eschewed any ‘set formula’ for determining 
how far is too far, preferring to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquiries.’”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).  Yet, 
some categorical rules do exist: pertinent to the instant case, when 
a government regulation totally deprives a property owner of all 
economic value of their property, a taking has occurred and the 
government must pay the property owner just compensation.  Id. 
At the outset, it bears noting that the Problem states that Lear 
“does not advance a claim for a partial regulatory taking 
based on the principles of Penn Central.  See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 317–
18 (2002); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d 535 U.S. 302.”  
Problem at 8 n.3.  In the Tahoe-Sierra cases, the Ninth Circuit 
noted the plaintiff not only did not advance a partial regulatory 
taking claim under Penn Central, they “stated explicitly on this ap-
peal that they do not argue that the regulations constitute a taking 
under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn Central.”  
Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773.  The Supreme Court commented 
that the “express[] disavow[al]” of Penn Central foreclosed the 
plaintiffs’ recovery.  Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334. 
While the various arguments raised by FWS and Brittain 
County would each preclude a claim of a categorical taking under 
Lucas, it is possible that Lear could recover under Penn Central 
even if any of the FWS and Brittain County defenses prevail.  Cf. 
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334 (“[I]f petitioners had challenged the 
application of the moratoria to their individual parcels, instead of 
making a facial challenge, some of them might have prevailed un-
der a Penn Central analysis.”).  Furthermore, the Problem argua-
bly leaves ambiguous whether Lear waived a Penn Central claim 
since it only says that she “does not advance a claim for a partial 
regulatory taking,” but does not say anything regarding an express 
disavowal of such a claim.  To be sure, failure to make an argument 
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in the district court generally results in waiver of that argument, 
subject to exceptions not applicable here.  See Cornhusker Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Kachman, 553 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ordinarily, 
an appellate court will not hear an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal.” (Internal quotation omitted)).  Nonethe-
less, it is important to recognize that some competitors may choose 
to make arguments under Penn Central, but this Bench Memo will 
not address a partial takings analysis under Penn Central. 
Returning to Lear’s challenge as actually made in the district 
court: Lear’s takings claim turns on six sub-issues: First, whether 
Lear’s takings claim is ripe; second, whether the relevant parcel is 
the Cordelia Lot or all of Lear Island; third, whether possible fu-
ture developability precludes Lear’s takings claim; fourth, whether 
the public trust doctrine precludes Lear’s takings claim; fifth, 
whether the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law 
can be combined to effect a Lucas taking of all economic value when 
neither regulation, acting alone, would completely deprive the Cor-
delia Lot of all economic value; and sixth, whether the option to 
receive some small residual value from the Brittain County But-
terfly Society defeats Lear’s claim that her property has been de-
prived of all economic value.  From a big picture standpoint, if Lear 
loses any of these arguments, her takings claim based on a total 
and permanent deprivation of all economic value likely fails. 
A. RIPENESS: Is Lear’s takings claim ripe even though she 
didn’t apply for an ITP? 
Initially, FWS (and Brittain County) will argue that Lear’s 
takings claim is not ripe since she did not apply for an ITP prior to 
filing suit.  Lear will respond that while she didn’t apply for an 
ITP, the process would have been futile and the cost associated 
with obtaining the permit exceeds the fair market value of the 
property in question. 
“The general rule is that a claim for a regulatory taking ‘is not 
ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the 
regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application 
of the regulations to the property at issue.’”  Morris v. United 
States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Williamson 
Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 
(1985)); see also Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 
1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsent denial of the permit, only an 
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extraordinary delay in the permitting process can give rise to a 
compensable taking.”); cf. United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985) (“A requirement that a per-
son obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her 
property does not itself ‘take’ the property in any sense . . . .”).  
“Evaluating whether the regulations effect a taking requires know-
ing to a reasonable degree of certainty what limitations the agency 
will, pursuant to regulations, place on the property.”  Morris, 392 
F.3d at 1376. 
It is undisputed that Lear did not complete the formal process 
for applying for an incidental take permit.  However, Lear can ar-
gue that not only did make an inquiry to the FWS, the FWS sent 
her a letter reiterating FWS Agent L.E. Pidopter’s position that 
she must submit an HCP that would, at a minimum, provide addi-
tional contiguous lupine habitat on an acre-for-acre basis.  Yet, 
FWS and Brittain County will reply that the inquiry is not tan-
tamount to a determination under the FWS’s rules, since Chapter 
3 of the Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook17 contemplates 
“pre-application coordination and HCP development.”  Even actual 
applications that are not completed because of an inability to reach 
agreement with the agency do not ripen takings claims.  See How-
ard W. Heck & Assoc. v. United States, 134 F.3d 1468, 1472 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998).  Further, the May 15, 2012 letter was not like a permit 
denial, but rather a cease and desist letter.  A cease and desist let-
ter, like an injunction, is not tantamount to a permit denial.  See 
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126 (injunction); Boise Cas-
cade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1346 (injunction); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. 
United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800–01 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (cease and de-
sist order).  In other words, the FWS letter was an “‘assertion of 
regulatory jurisdiction,’” which has been held insufficient to ripen 
a claim for a taking.  See Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1346 
(quoting Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126).  “The mere 
fact that an adverse decision may have been likely does not excuse 
a party from a statutory or regulatory requirement that it exhaust 
administrative remedies.”  Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 
F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 
17. Available at https://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/per-
mits/hcp/hcphandbook.html. 
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However, Lear will argue that either of two exceptions save 
her claim.  First, if resort to the administrative process would be 
futile, a takings claim plaintiff need not pursue it.  See Freeman v. 
United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 1, 6 (2015).  Second, pursuit of a permit 
is also unnecessary if a plaintiff can establish that “the procedure 
to acquire a permit is so burdensome as to effectively deprive plain-
tiffs of their property rights.”  Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 
147, 164 (1996).18  Whether Lear’s takings claim is ripe thus turns 
on these exceptions. 
First, Lear will argue that the application process would have 
been futile.  FWS Agent L.E. Pidopter had informed Lear that her 
ITP application would have to be accompanied by an HCP, see ESA 
§ 10(a)(2)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A), and that any HCP would 
necessarily require additional contiguous lupine habitat on an 
acre-for-acre basis.  The only contiguous land is the Goneril Lot, 
and Goneril, who is estranged from Cordelia, has refused to partic-
ipate in any HCP that requires restrictions on her land.  Moreover, 
whatever the technical requirements of the futility exception, Lear 
will argue that she meets the spirit of the rule: “The reason for this 
exception is that in such circumstances, no uncertainty remains 
regarding the impact of the regulation, certainty being the basis 
for the ripeness requirement.”  Greenbrier v. United States, 193 
F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).  Consequently, 
Lear will argue that denial was inevitable, see Gilbert v. City of 
Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 1991), and further adminis-
trative process could not “reasonably result in a more definite 
statement of the impact of the regulation.”  See Morris, 392 F.3d at 
1376; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625–26 
(2001) (noting that when an agency “makes clear the extent of de-
velopment permitted . . . federal ripeness rules do not require the 
submission of further and futile applications with other agencies”). 
 
18. Although no party addressed the issue before the district court, Lear’s 
takings claim against Brittain County is also probably ripe.  The Problem indi-
cated that the Constitution of the State of New Union does not include a just com-
pensation clause nor do the State of New Union’s statutes provide a procedure for 
seeking just compensation.  Problem at 9 n.5.  The Supreme Court has suggested 
that an absence of state-level just compensation procedures would ripen a federal 
claim for an unconstitutional taking without just compensation against a state 
entity.  See Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194.   
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FWS and Brittain County will respond that “[t]he futility 
exception does not alter an owner’s obligation to file one meaning-
ful development proposal.”  S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Ange-
les, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990).  The Federal Circuit has ex-
plained “the futility exception simply serves ‘to protect property 
owners from being required to submit multiple applications when 
the manner in which the first application was rejected makes it 
clear that no project will be approved.”  Heck & Assoc., 134 F.3d at 
1472 (quoting S. Pac. Transp. Co., 922 F.2d at 504).  “The failure 
to follow all applicable administrative procedures can only be ex-
cused in the limited circumstance in which the administrative en-
tity has no discretion regarding the regulation’s applicability and 
its only option is enforcement.”  Greenbrier, 193 F.3d at 1359.  Even 
if Pidopter is correct about the FWS would likely require, they will 
argue, unless that result is compelled by law and the FWS lacks 
discretion, then Lear’s claim is not made ripe by the futility excep-
tion.  Indeed, Morris was a takings case involving ITPs and the 
ESA, and the Federal Circuit rejected a claim that the application 
process was futile, reasoning in part that cooperation and discre-
tion were built in to the ITP process.  392 F.3d at 1377. 
Second, Lear will argue that since the cost of the HCP exceeds 
the fair market value of the lot, the ITP application process is alto-
gether confiscatory.  In other words, if the cost of applying for an 
ITP is so high that it totally outweighs the economic value of the 
property, there is little difference between a regulation that com-
pletely prohibits economically valuable use of property and one 
that makes economically valuable use impossible because applying 
for the permit is too costly relative to the property.  See Gilbert, 
932 F.2d at 61 n.12; Lakewood Assoc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 
320, 333 (1999); Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 164; Stearns Co. v. United 
States, 34 Fed. Cl. 264, 272 (1995).  “Indeed, a regulatory program 
which puts a landowner to the Hobson’s choice of spending good 
money after bad in the remote hope of obtaining final administra-
tive action or losing the right to assert a claim guaranteed by the 
Fifth Amendment may well be a regulatory program gone far 
afield.”  Moore v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 603, 613 (E.D. Va. 
1991).  FWS and Brittain County will counter that this argument 
was rejected in Morris.  See 392 F.3d at 1377–78.  “The cost of an 
ITP application is unknowable until the agency has had some 
meaningful opportunity to exercise its discretion to assist in the 
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process.”  Id. at 1377.  Moreover, in subsequent cases, the Court of 
Federal Claims has emphasized that the Hage requires not just 
economic futility, but that the procedure itself be unreasonable.  
See Robbins v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 381, 388 (1998).  The ITP 
application process, including the submission of an HCP, is reason-
able, they will contend, and the rule announced in Hage and 
Stearns does not apply. 
B. RELEVANT PARCEL: Should the district court have 
considered all 1,000 acres of Lear Island as a whole or 
just the 10 acres of the Cordelia Lot? 
If Lear’s takings claim is ripe, then the court must determine 
what the relevant parcel of property is for the purposes of Lear’s 
Lucas takings claim.  FWS and Brittain County will argue that 
the relevant parcel is Lear Island as a whole since Cordelia Lear 
did not come into possession of the Cordelia Lot until 2005, follow-
ing her father’s passing.  In contrast, Lear will argue that the rel-
evant parcel is just the Cordelia Lot.  The Penn Central Court ex-
plained that 
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular 
segment have been entirely abrogated.  In deciding whether a par-
ticular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court fo-
cuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature 
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a 
whole . . . . 
438 U.S. at 130–31.  In the context of a Lucas taking claim, “the 
question of whether there has been a partial or total loss of eco-
nomic use . . . depends on what is the specific property that was 
affected by the permit denial.”  Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United 
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated on other 
grounds by Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606, as recognized in Bass Enters. 
Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
This inquiry “is often expressed in the form of a fraction, the nu-
merator of which is the value of the subject property encumbered 
by regulation and the denominator of which is the value of the 
same property not so encumbered.”  Walcek v. United States, 49 
Fed. Cl. 248, 258 (2001).  Therefore, “one of the critical questions 
is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is to 
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furnish the denominator of the fraction.’”  Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165, 1192 (1967)).  The Court has “expressed discomfort with 
the logic of this rule,” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631, lamenting “the 
rhetorical force of [the] ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’ 
rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear 
the ‘property interest’ against which the loss of value is to be meas-
ured.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
To identify the relevant parcel for the purposes of a takings 
claim, courts have considered a variety of factors regarding “how 
both the property-owner and the government treat (and have 
treated) the property.”  District Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship v. D.C., 
198 F.3d 874, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  The factors include “the degree 
of contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the par-
cel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which the 
restricted lots benefit the unregulated lot.”  Id.  To be sure, the 
factors are nonexclusive.  See Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 
310, 318 (1991).  Stated differently, courts apply “flexible approach, 
designed to account for factual nuances.”  Loveladies Harbor, 28 
F.3d at 1181; see also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 
1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 1981).  “These factual nuances include consid-
eration of the timing of transfers in light of the developing regula-
tory environment.”  Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d at 1181. 
Lear’s strongest argument may be to point out that a district 
court’s determination following a bench trial regarding the rele-
vant parcel is reviewed for clear error as a finding of fact.  See id. 
(“The trial court concluded that land developed or sold before the 
regulatory environment existed should not be included in the de-
nominator.  The Government has failed to convince us that the trial 
court clearly erred in this conclusion.”).  FWS and Brittain 
County should argue in response that while the district court’s 
factual findings would only be reviewable for clear error, the rele-
vant parcel determination should be treated as a legal conclusion 
or application of law to fact that is reviewable de novo on appeal.  
See Cree, 157 F.3d at 769.  In the alternative, FWS and Brittain 
County may argue that the district court applied the wrong stand-
ard: the district court appeared to reject the prevailing “flexible ap-
proach” standard and apply something more rigid instead.  See 
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Problem at 10.  Applying the long legal standard is an abuse of 
discretion.  See Heimmerman v. First Union Mtg. Corp., 305 F.3d 
1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002). 
FWS and Brittain County will liken this case to District In-
town (and cases like it) in that the Lears held these lands as a sin-
gle lot for more than 150 years.  See District Intown Props., 198 
F.3d at 880 (concluding nine lots should be treated as a single lot 
in part because “District Intown purchased the property as a whole 
in 1961 and treated it as a single indivisible property for more than 
25 years”).  FWS and Brittain County will also argue that, like Dis-
trict Intown, King James Lear essentially treated the three lots as 
a single lot even after subdivision in 1965.  See id.  Indeed, the Cor-
delia Lot didn’t come into separate possession or ownership until 
King James’s passing in 2005.  Further, the Cordelia Lot is contig-
uous with at least one other lot, the Goneril Lot.  Lear’s strongest 
response is to emphasize that there is no unity of ownership—un-
like in District Intown, she doesn’t own the contiguous lots.  Fur-
ther, she will reply that it is unfair to treat the parcels as a whole 
since she holds no rights in the contiguous Goneril Lot and is in 
fact estranged from her sister.  She will also argue that the Cor-
delia Lot does not benefit the Goneril Lot.  Additionally, the facts 
suggest that however it was treated by the government in the past, 
the Cordelia Lot is taxed separately now.  In fact, the Brittain 
Town Planning Board approved the subdivision of lots in 1965 and 
approved the construction of one single-family residence on each 
lot. 
FWS and Brittain County may make two other arguments 
in favor of treating Lear Island as a single parcel, but neither is 
likely to be particularly persuasive.  First, FWS and Brittain 
County may argue that the mere fact that Lear acquired the prop-
erty after the passage of the ESA and adoption of the Brittain 
County Wetlands Preservation Law defeats her claim.  They might 
reason that the reasonable “investment-backed expectations” 
should be based on when the property existed as a whole.  See Penn 
Central, 438 U.S. at 124.  However, this argument is unsupporta-
ble: Lear will correctly argue Palazzolo forecloses any argument 
that post-regulation acquisition of the Cordelia Lot automatically 
defeats her takings claim.  See 533 U.S. at 627.  In fact, Palazzolo 
expressly contemplated that an heir or successor in interest could 
(at least under some circumstances) maintain a takings challenge 
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to a regulation that antedated the heir’s acquisition; “Future gen-
erations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on 
the use and value of land.”  Id. at 627–28.  Second, FWS and Brit-
tain County may also argue that if the Cordelia Lot is the rele-
vant parcel, then persons with portions (but not all) of their prop-
erty subject to development restrictions will be encouraged to 
divide their property into developable and undevelopable tracts, 
and then seek just compensation for the deprivation of economic 
value in the undevelopable tract.  Lear should argue in response 
that Loveladies Harbor forecloses this argument, when it acknowl-
edged that the “flexible approach” accounts for the factual nuance 
of the timing of the transfer.  28 F.3d at 1181.  She will be able to 
accurately point out there is no evidence of bad faith in the record 
and that the transfer occurred 8 years prior to the passage of the 
ESA and 17 years prior to the enactment of the Brittain County 
Wetlands Preservation Law. 
C. NATURAL DESTRUCTION: Does the fact that the 
Cordelia Lot will become developable in approximately 
ten years if Lear stops mowing the heath each October, 
resulting the natural destruction of the Karner Blue 
habitat, preclude Lear’s takings claim? 
At trial, FWS argued that Lear’s takings claim must neces-
sarily fail because her ability to develop the land has not been to-
tally deprived, but merely delayed.  The Karner Blue requires 
fields of blue lupine flowers to survive, which in turn require par-
tial shade from a successional forest to survive.  If Lear ceases an-
nual mowing of the Heath, it will convert to a successional forest 
in about 10 years.  In that case, the lupine flowers will not be able 
to grow, and Karner Blue larvae will not be able to feed.  With the 
habitat naturally destroyed, Lear will be able to develop a portion 
of the lot without taking Karner Blues.  At trial, Brittain County 
joined FWS’s argument.  Lear disagreed, arguing the time to de-
termine the existence of economically viable use was now.  The dis-
trict court agreed with Lear, recognizing precedent that permits 
development or use of land to be delayed, but viewed 10 years as 
too long a period of time. 
Lucas held that a permanent deprivation of all economically 
productive use constituted a taking for which just compensation 
was due.  See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 
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U.S. at 332.  The Supreme Court has not determined when a tem-
porary restriction becomes a permanent one.  See Tahoe-Sierra, 
535 U.S. at 335–36 (“We have no occasion to address . . . the dis-
tinction between a temporary restriction and one that is perma-
nent.”).  One way of looking at the issue is one of timing: if 10 years 
is not too long to wait to develop her property, then Lear’s takings 
claim must fail since she has not been deprived of all economically 
viable use; rather, she has merely been delayed in exercising some 
economically viable use.  Another way of looking at the issue is 
whether indefiniteness is tantamount to permanence: if so, then 
future developability because of a hypothetical change in the facts 
is irrelevant—the ESA imposes an indefinite bar to Lear’s devel-
oping the Cordelia Lot, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require the government to pay just compensation. 
FWS and Brittain County can make a persuasive argument 
that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Tahoe-Sierra totally precludes 
finding a categorical taking based on a delay in developability.  In 
Tahoe-Sierra, an interstate development authority adopted a pair 
of ordinances resulting in a 32-month moratorium on development 
of land near Lake Tahoe.  535 U.S. at 306–07.  When real estate 
developers, who owned fee simple estates, brought a takings claim 
under Lucas (but expressly disavowed a claim under Penn Cen-
tral), the Court rejected a claim for a categorical, but temporary, 
taking.  See id. at 332.  “Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be 
rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, 
because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition 
is lifted.”  Id.  The Tahoe-Sierra Court emphasized that it did “not 
reject a categorical rule in this case because a 32-month morato-
rium is just not that harsh.  Instead, we reject a categorical rule 
because we conclude that the Penn Central framework adequately 
directs the inquiry to the proper considerations—only one of which 
is the length of the delay.”  Id. at 338 n.34.  FWS and Brittain 
County can draw further support from Boise Cascade Corp., which 
rejected a categorical challenge to a temporary taking in the con-
text of the ESA.  See 296 F.3d at 1350. 
Lear can find sympathetic language in Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent in Tahoe-Sierra, which would employ the Lu-
cas categorical takings approach after a delay of 6 years.  See 535 
U.S. at 343, 346–51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  Of course, FWS 
and Brittain County can reply, as the Tahoe-Sierra majority did, 
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that 6 years is an arbitrary amount of time.  Further, dissents are, 
by definition, not the law.  And, in this regard, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent may bolster the argument that 10 years is not 
too long: Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented that “the Court would 
not view even a 10–year moratorium as a taking under Lucas be-
cause the moratorium is not ‘permanent.’”  Id. at 347 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
But Lear can also use Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent as a 
bulwark for the argument that the delay here is indefinite, and 
that indefiniteness is tantamount to permanence.  While 10 years 
is a good estimate of how long it may take the successional forest 
to overtake the Heath, there can be no certainty.  Lear may point 
out that laws certainly can change and the government is allowed 
to abandon condemned land, but courts have found those situa-
tions to be takings all the same.  See id. at 346 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1011–12 (amendment of chal-
lenged ordinance), and United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 26 (1958) 
(abandonment of condemned land)).  Hypothetical future changes 
in facts and law do not make indefinite restrictions temporary.  
FWS and Brittain County can point to cases like Riverside 
Bayview Homes and Boise Cascade Corp. as counterexamples: in 
those cases injunctions and permit requirements (which the prop-
erty owners had not fully availed themselves of) indefinitely lim-
ited the property owners’ use of their property, but those courts 
suggested that the restrictions were not actually permanent and 
that the property owners had not suffered a compensable taking. 
As a final point, Lear may point out, as the district court rec-
ognized, the irony of the FWS relying on the natural destruction of 
an endangered species critical habitat as a way to avoid providing 
just compensation for protecting the Karner Blues.  Moreover, the 
ESA expressly permits the FWS to acquire lands to protect and 
conserve endangered species.  ESA § 5, 16 U.S.C. § 1534.  Lear may 
accordingly argue that this is exactly the kind of situation in which 
FWS should use its acquisition power. 
D. EQUAL FOOTING AND PUBLIC TRUST: Does the public 
trust doctrine, inherent in the title to the Cordelia Lot, 
preclude her takings claim? 
At trial, Brittain County argued that the public trust doc-
trine inhered in Lear’s title and precluded her takings claim with 
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respect to the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law.  FWS 
joined in this argument.  Lucas recognized that background prin-
ciples of property law limited the Takings Clause: “Where the State 
seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically 
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the log-
ically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows 
that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin 
with.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (emphasis added).  The Federal 
Circuit has prescribed a similar analytical framework for takings 
claims: first, a court should determine whether a takings plaintiff 
has a “stick in the bundle of property rights”; second, if so, the court 
must determine whether the governmental action at issue consti-
tuted a taking of that ‘stick.’”  Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 
F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit has recognized 
that, where the public trust doctrine applies, it is indeed a back-
ground principle of law indicating that the proscribed interest was 
not part of the property owner’s interest to begin with and thus can 
indeed defeat a Lucas takings claim.  See Esplanade Props., LLC 
v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Thus, the nub of FWS and Brittain County’s argument is 
that if either the equal footing doctrine vests title to the submerged 
lands in New Union or the public trust doctrine inhered in Lear’s 
title, Lear never possessed a requisite stick in the submerged 
marshlands that the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law 
could “take.”  The district court disagreed, reasoning Brittain 
County had pointed to no statement of state law as to the existence 
or scope of the public trust doctrine in New Union.  The district 
court also reasoned that waters not influenced by the tides were 
not navigable in 1803, and that, in any event, the equal footing 
doctrine did not vest title to submerged lands in the State where 
Congress granted title to submerged lands to a private person prior 
to statehood.  This issue turns on two sub-inquiries: first, whether 
Lear or New Union owns the submerged lands; and second, if Lear 
owns the submerged lands, whether the public trust doctrine limits 
her ability to develop property there. 
The public trust doctrine dates to Roman law, PPL Montana 
LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012), and states that a 
State holds title to the beds of navigable waters “in trust for the 
people of the state that they may enjoy the navigation of the wa-
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ter . . .” Ill. Cent.  R. Co. v Illinois 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).  “Be-
cause title to [lands underlying certain waters] was important to 
the sovereign’s ability to control navigation, fishing, and other com-
mercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this land was 
considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.”  Utah Div. of 
State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987).  In this way, 
the public trust and equal footing doctrines are closely related.  
“The Court from an early date has acknowledged that the people 
of each of the Thirteen Colonies at the time of independence ‘be-
came themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute 
right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for 
their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered 
by the Constitution to the general government.’”  Idaho v. Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997) (quoting Martin v. 
Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)).  “States entering the Union after 
1789 did so on an ‘equal footing’ with the original States and so 
have similar ownership over these ‘sovereign lands.’”  Id. (quoting 
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228–29 (1845)).  “In consequence of 
this rule, a State’s title to these sovereign lands arises from the 
equal footing doctrine and is ‘conferred not by Congress but by the 
Constitution itself.’”  Id. (quoting Oregon v. Corvalis Sand & 
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977)).  Thus, upon statehood, “un-
der the constitutional principle of equality among the several 
states the title [submerged lands] then passe[s] to the state, if the 
[water] was navigable, and if the [submerged lands] had not al-
ready been disposed of by the United States.”  See United States v. 
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); accord United States v. 
Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). 
Thereafter, a state is free to retain the submerged lands or 
dispose of them, but the public trust doctrine dictates that it may 
not abdicate its interest in navigable waters and its duty to protect 
the use of the water for navigation and fishing in trust to the pub-
lic.  Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453.  The precise “contours of that public 
trust” are determined by state, not federal law.  PPL Montana, 132 
S. Ct. at 1235.  The States’ power to determine the contours of its 
public trust doctrine are “subject only to ‘the paramount power of 
the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation 
in interstate and foreign commerce.’”  Id. at 1228 (quoting United 
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)). 
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First, Lear will argue that the public trust doctrine did not 
apply to non-tidal navigable waters like Lake Union in 1803.  See 
PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1227 (collecting cases rejecting the 
tide-based distinction regarding navigable waters, the earliest of 
which was decided in 1810).  FWS will point out that navigability 
turns on whether the water was navigable at the time of statehood 
“based on the ‘natural and ordinary condition’ of the water.”  Id. at 
1228 (quoting Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922)). The 
Problem is not specific about when New Union obtained statehood.  
As an inland lake, Lake Union is presumably not influenced by the 
tides.  Therefore, Lear will argue that since the tides did not influ-
ence Lake Union in 1803, it cannot be a public trust water. 
FWS and Brittain County may reply directly to Lear’s tide-
based argument by pointing to case language regarding the Eng-
lish common law rule suggesting it would have applied more 
broadly had England shared America’s larger waterways that are 
not otherwise influenced by the tide: “the reason of the rule would 
equally apply to navigable waters above the flow of the tide; that 
reason being, that the public authorities ought to have entire con-
trol of the great passageways of commerce and navigation, to be 
exercised for the public advantage and convenience.”  Barney v. 
City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337–38 (1876).  Indeed, in The Propel-
ler Genesee Chief, Chief Justice Taney wrote that the constitutional 
drafters and founding generation would not have intended to limit 
the benefit of admiralty courts to incidents taking place over tidally 
influenced waters.  53 U.S. 443, 454 (1851).  Lear may point out 
the irony that in making that statement, the Genesee Chief Court 
had to overrule a pair of older cases that applied the tide-based 
distinction.  FWS and Brittain County may also choose to argue 
that some early public trust cases, such as Carson v. Blazer, can be 
read to suggest that first, that tide-based distinction in navigabil-
ity never applied in the United States.  See 2 Binn. 475, 484–85 
(Pa. 1810) (“[T]he uniform idea has ever been, that only such parts 
of the common law as were applicable to our local situation have 
been received in this government.  The principle is self-evident.”).  
Lear can reply that the Supreme Court has characterized those 
cases as a rejection of the tide-based distinction.  See Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe, 521 U.S. at 286.  Finally, FWS and Brittain County may 
choose to point out that even some English common law cases rec-
ognized the flow of the tides is not truly what made a body of water 
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navigable and, therefore was not controlling.  See Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 487 (1988) (discussing Mayor 
of Lynn v. Turner, 98 Eng. Rep. 980, 981 (K.B. 1774)); see also Ex-
ecutors of Cates v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L. 580, 582 (1822) (discuss-
ing English common law). 
In any event, Lake Union is navigable-in-fact; it is a large in-
terstate lake that has been used for interstate navigation, includ-
ing the transport of agricultural products.  See United States v. 
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
557, 563 (1871).  Notably, navigability as it applies in the public 
trust and equal footing context does not require interstate naviga-
tion; rather, it simply requires that the water be used or suscepti-
ble to use in navigation, even intrastate navigation.  PPL Montana, 
132 S. Ct. at 1229; Utah, 283 U.S. at 76.  Thus, FWS and Brittain 
County’s stronger reply is to Lear’s initial point out that the pub-
lic trust cases Lear cites are state cases, and that the question of 
navigability is a federal question.  Utah, 283 U.S. at 75.  PPL Mon-
tana directs a court to look at the physical characteristics of the 
water body at the time of statehood, not the legal regime.  See PPL 
Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1228.  Indeed, “[t]o treat the question as 
turning on the varying local rules would give the Constitution a 
diversified operation where uniformity was intended.”  Holt State 
Bank, 270 U.S. at 56.  If the extent of state sovereignty over sub-
merged lands turned on the state of a developing legal regime at 
the time of statehood, it could violate the equal footing doctrine.  
Finally, FWS and Brittain County may point to Illinois (which 
achieved statehood in 1818) and Minnesota (which achieved state-
hood in 1858) as examples of cases where statehood preceded the 
Supreme Court’s apparent recognition that the appropriate test 
was navigability and not whether the water is tidally influenced.  
See Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 57 (concluding, in 1926, that a 
small intrastate lake was navigable and thus belonged to Minne-
sota under the equal footing doctrine); Ill. Central, 146 U.S. at 452 
(holding, in 1892, that state sovereignty, and thus the public trust 
doctrine, extended to submerged lands in the Great Lakes). 
Lear will argue that even if Lake Union was navigable at the 
time of New Union’s statehood, Congress’s grant to Cornelius Lear 
in 1803 (sometime prior to statehood) defeats Brittain County’s ar-
gument.  Congress granted fee simple absolute to all of Lear Island 
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and to “all lands under water within a 300-foot radius of the shore-
line of said island,” as well as an additional grant of lands under 
water in the shallow strait separating Lear Island from the main-
land to Cornelius Lear.  Lear may argue, as the district court rea-
soned, that this defeats an argument that New Union can avail 
itself of the public trust doctrine.  Certainly, “Congress has the 
power before statehood to convey land beneath navigable waters.”  
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001); Shively v. Bowlby, 
152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894); see U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress 
shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Reg-
ulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States.”). 
Brittain County and FWS will reply that “[a] court deciding 
a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must . . . begin 
with a strong presumption against conveyance by the 
United States.”  Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 
(1981); see also United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 35 (1997).  A 
prior congressional grant of submerged lands only defeats a future 
State’s claim when clear language appears in the grant.  See Mon-
tana, 450 U.S. at 552 (collecting cases).  Ultimately, “[w]hether ti-
tle to submerged lands rests with a State, of course, is ultimately 
a matter of federal intent.”  Alaska, 521 U.S. at 36.  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly found that pre-statehood congressional 
grants of submerged lands do not overcome the presumption.  See, 
e.g., Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 58 (holding lake entirely con-
tained in lands given by pre-statehood congressional grant was 
property of the State, not congressional grantee).  The Holt State 
Bank Court commented that there was nothing in the grant there 
“which even approaches a grant of rights in lands underlying nav-
igable waters; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the 
established policy . . . of treating such lands as held for the benefit 
of the future State.”  Id. at 58–59.  In fact, in only one case did the 
prior grant defeat a State’s equal footing claim, see Choctaw Nation 
v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1970), “and indispensable to 
the [Choctaw Nation] holding was a promise to the Indian Tribe 
that no part of the reservation would become part of a State.”  Utah 
Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 198; see Montana, 450 U.S. at 555 
n.5; Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 635. 
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Lear will argue that the grant was rendered “in clear and es-
pecial words,” Martin, 41 U.S. at 411, and “confirmed in terms em-
braces the land under the waters” of Lake Union.  See Packer v. 
Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672 (1891); see also Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.  
The 1803 grant specifically refers to “all lands under water within 
a 300-foot radius of the shoreline of [Lear Island].”  FWS and Brit-
tain County will argue that the indispensible element of Choctaw 
Nation—that the United States promised “that ‘no part of the land 
granted to them shall ever be embraced in any Territory or State,’” 
397 U.S. at 635—is absent here, and that that fact is controlling.  
In their view, it is the intention to defeat a future State’s equal 
footing claim that must be “‘definitely declared or otherwise made 
very plain.’”  Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 202 (quoting 
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55).  Lear can persuasively reply, 
however, that the Utah Division of State Lands opinion expressly 
equated the two intents in the context of a grant to a third party: 
“When Congress intends to convey land under navigable waters to 
a private party, of necessity it must also intend to defeat the future 
State’s claim to the land.”  Id. 
If the equal footing doctrine does not vest title to New Union, 
then Lear will argue that Illinois Central’s holding regarding the 
public trust was “necessarily a statement of Illinois law,” Appleby 
v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).  In fact, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly stressed that state law defines the rights un-
der the public trust doctrine.  See Packer, 137 U.S. at 669 (“[W]hat-
ever incidents or rights attach to the ownership of property con-
veyed by the government will be determined by the states, subject 
to the condition that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the 
grants, or the use and enjoyment of the property, by the grantee.”).  
“[T]he public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . .”  
PPL Montana, 132 U.S. at 1235.  The Problem makes clear that 
there is no decisional law from New Union exists regarding the 
scope of the public trust doctrine.  Problem at 11.  FWS and Brit-
tain County will point to language in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
of Idaho that while Illinois Central was a statement of state law, 
“it invoked the principle in American law recognizing the weighty 
public interests in submerged lands.”  521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997).  
Therefore, since holding the waters in public trust is a such close 
incident of sovereignty, see Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 
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195, it is not at all unreasonable to infer that the public trust doc-
trine has “‘always existed’” in New Union even if not explicitly rec-
ognized.  See Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 985 (quoting Orion 
Corp. v State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (Wa. 1987)).  In their view, since 
the doctrine has always existed, it would necessarily inhere in 
Lear’s title.  However, because public trust issues can be quite 
thorny, and the precise public trust issue is not only the existence 
of the public trust doctrine in New Union but whether and how it 
applies to the submerged lands near the shore of Lear Island, Lear 
can point to cases where federal courts have dismissed claims in-
volving unsettled public trust issues.  See, e.g., Brigham Oil & Gas, 
L.P. v. North Dakota Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 866 F. Supp. 2d 
1082, 1089–91 (D.N.D. 2012).  Cases like Brigham Oil demonstrate 
that federal courts resist construing the scope of a State’s public 
trust doctrine whenever possible. 
E. DEPRIVATION OF ALL ECONOMIC VALUE: Can the 
ESA and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation 
Law be joined for purposes of Lear’s categorical takings 
claim based on a complete deprivation of economic 
value? 
As an ultimate issue at trial, Lear argued that the ESA and 
Brittain County Wetlands Law have totally deprived the Cordelia 
Lot of economic value, amounting to a taking under Lucas.  FWS 
and Brittain County each argued that their respective regula-
tions did not individually amount to a Lucas taking.  FWS argued 
that the ESA (nor any other federal regulation) prohibited Lear 
from constructing a residence in cove area.  Brittain County 
made a similar argument: the Brittain County Wetlands Preserva-
tion Law did not prohibit construction in the Heath.  In any event, 
FWS and Brittain County argued that no Lucas taking occurred 
because the property retains some residual economic value: the 
Brittain County Butterfly Society has offered to pay $1,000 a year 
in rent for wildlife viewing.  The district court disagreed, conclud-
ing that the regulations could be considered together and that the 
butterfly society’s offer did not preclude Lear’s takings claim. 
1.  Whether the ESA and Brittain County Wetlands 
Law Can Be Combined to Consider Whether a 
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Taking Has Occurred. 
Regarding the question of whether two regulations adminis-
tered by two defendants can be jointly considered as effecting a to-
tal deprivation of all economic use of property under Lucas, there 
does not appear to be precedent on point.  Because of the general 
lack of decisive precedent on the matter, the parties will likely 
make a number of policy arguments. 
To be sure, Lear may argue that precedent supports the joint 
consideration of multiple regulations or administrative actions.  
She can cite Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337–38, and Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980),19 as cases where two municipal 
ordinances were considered together in a takings claim.  Addition-
ally, Lear may cite United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980) 
considered whether a federal statute—25 U.S.C. § 357, which au-
thorizes a state or local government to condemn lands allotted to 
Native Americans in the same manner other lands held in fee may 
be condemned—permitted a municipal government to condemn 
land by physical taking.  Clarke thus arguably demonstrates a 
blending of state and federal law in the context of takings claims. 
FWS and Brittain County can reply that none of those cases 
involve takings that were joint takings by two different govern-
ments.  For instance, Clarke did not did not feature a claim of a 
joint taking by the United States and local government, but rather 
an intergovernmental dispute in which an Alaska municipality at-
tempted to physically occupy federal land held in trust by Native 
Americans.  More importantly, they can argue that even if two pro-
visions of a single regulatory schema could be combined in a tak-
ings claim in some cases, as in Agins, it would be inappropriate 
where two levels of government are concerned.  It might make 
sense to consider one regulatory schema (administered by one gov-
ernment entity) as a whole, but considering two different govern-
ment entities’ regulations together is simply impractical.  Federal-
ism generally permits different governments to pass different laws, 
and, the federal government generally cannot control the applica-
bility of a state or local law absent preemption.  Cf. Tahoe-Sierra, 
 
19. Agins was abrogated on other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 
544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).  The Court in Lingle “conclude[d] that the “substantially 
advances” formula announced in Agins is not a valid method of identifying regu-
latory takings for which the Fifth Amendment requires just compensation.”   
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535 U.S. at 344 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing causation 
under takings claims brought pursuant to section 1983); Espla-
nade Props., 307 F.3d at 984 (“[A] plaintiff must make a showing 
of causation between the government action and the alleged depri-
vation.”). 
Lear can persuasively reply, however, that cooperative feder-
alism is conducive to joint takings.  For instance, she can point to 
the Clean Water Act, which requires a potential discharger to seek 
certification from States in which the discharge will occur that the 
discharge will not result in violation of the State’s water quality 
standards.  Clean Water Act § 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).  
The State may condition certification on compliance with State wa-
ter quality standards.  Id. § 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).  EPA has 
a related rule that prohibits the issuance of a federal permit if it 
“cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality re-
quirements of all affected States.”  40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d).  Lear 
might point this or similar cooperative schema as an example 
where a taking could be foreseeable. 
Lear can argue the nature of an inverse condemnation suit 
supports the conclusion that multiple provisions of law should be 
able to be considered together: “‘[i]nverse condemnation is a cause 
of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of 
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defend-
ant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent do-
main has been attempted by the taking agency.’”  Clarke, 445 U.S. 
at 257 (quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)).  Indeed, an inverse con-
demnation suit may be appropriate precisely because the govern-
ment is unaware it has taken the plaintiff’s property.  Here, Lear 
can argue that the point of an inverse condemnation suit is to re-
cover the value that has actually “been taken.”  The fact that is 
actually been taken by the combined operation of the regulatory 
regimes of two different governments should not preclude recovery. 
In this vein, Lear will also argue that the two regulations in 
this case produced an “indivisible injury,” so the FWS and Brittain 
County should be jointly and severally liable.  See, e.g., Velsicol 
Chem. Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337, 343 (Tenn. 1976) (“[W]e . . . 
adopt . . . the rule for determining joint and several liability that 
when an indivisible injury has been caused by the concurrent, but 
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independent, wrongful acts or omissions of two or more wrongdo-
ers . . . .”).20  FWS and Brittain County can reply that even if this 
rule were law, it wouldn’t save Lear’s claim.  The Velsicol Chemical 
rule requires an injury to be “indivisible.”  See id.  In fact, the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee relied on decisions from Texas, Landers 
v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. 
1952), and the Sixth Circuit, Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, 
495 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1974), which reasoned in adopting the 
same rule that the rule was necessary to save a plaintiff in some 
cases from bearing an “impossible burden” of proving which de-
fendant contributed which share to an indivisible injury.  Here, 
they will argue, that is hardly the case: the ESA plainly affects one 
portion of Lear’s property (the Heath), and the Brittain County 
Wetlands Preservation Law affects another (the Cove).  In their 
view, there is nothing at all indivisible about the injury; Lear 
might have had two separate partial takings claims, but she has 
no categorical takings claim regarding the parcel as a whole. 
FWS and Brittain County may also argue that the indirect 
effects of government regulation are not always clear to legislators, 
so combining multiple regulations is not necessarily fair to the gov-
ernment.  This is particularly true of a regulation’s intersections 
with other statutes and ordinances.  Lear can respond, however, 
that Congress (and other legislators) are presumed to know the 
state of the law.  Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 
(1979). 
2.  Whether the Cordelia Lot Has Been Deprived of All 
Economic Value. 
FWS and Brittain County will point out that the Cordelia 
Lot has not actually been deprived of all economic value.  The Brit-
tain County Butterfly Society offered to pay Lear $1,000 per year 
in rent for wildlife viewing. 
They will point out the Supreme Court’s precedent has “uni-
formly rejected” the proposition that a mere “diminution in value, 
standing alone, can establish a ‘taking.’”  Penn Central, 438 U.S. 
at 131.  Indeed, in making that statement, the Penn Central Court 
identified diminutions in value of 87.5 and 75 percent as examples 
 
20. Many states have such a common law rule.  The Problem simply cited 
Velsicol Chemical as an example of the “prevailing rule.”  Problem at 12.   
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of takings claim it had rejected.  See id. (citing Hadacheck v. Se-
bastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% diminution) and Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution)).  
Instead, these diminutions are merely the result of the government 
“adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life for the com-
mon good.”  See id.  at 124.  Indeed, the Supreme Court did not find 
a taking in Palazzolo, which featured an overwhelming 93% loss of 
value in the plaintiff’s property.  See 533 U.S. at 616, 631.  FWS 
and Brittain County can find similar support in Lucas: in a foot-
note, the majority of the Court suggested the proper recourse for a 
property owner deprived of 95% of economic value was a claim for 
partial regulatory taking under Penn Central, not a claim for a cat-
egorical taking under Lucas.  505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. 
FWS and Brittain County will also argue that even if ESA 
and the Brittain County Wetlands Preservation Law eliminate the 
“most profitable use” or the “most beneficial use,” it is not disposi-
tive.  See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).  Supportive lan-
guage is also found in later Supreme Court discussions on the 
topic: “In the Lucas context, of course, the complete elimination of 
a property’s value is the determinative factor.”  Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added).  In con-
trast, Lear will argue that she retains at most a “token interest.”  
See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (“Assuming a taking is otherwise 
established, a State may not evade the duty to compensate on the 
premise that the landowner is left with a token interest.”). 
Further, Lear can point to Loveladies Harbor as an example 
where something less than a 100% diminution of value was recog-
nized as a total taking.  There, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s conclusion that where property value was dimin-
ished from $2,658,000 to $12,500—a more than 99% loss.  See 28 
F.3d at 1178, 1182.  Here, the Cordelia Lot had a fair market value 
of $100,000 prior to the regulation.  There is no market in which 
she can sell the Cordelia Lot, so the property’s value appears value 
appears to be $0.  Of course, the property has a rental value of 
$1,000 a year in light of the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s of-
fer.  However, the property taxes on the Cordelia Lot are $1,500 
annually—resulting in a $500 annual net loss.  Lear will thus ar-
gue that the value of the Cordelia Lot is nil. 
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However, Lear’s strongest argument is that the district court 
found as a matter of fact that the Cordelia Lot had been deprived 
of all economic value.  She will point out that Loveladies Harbor 
counsels that this factual determination reviewable for clear error.  
See id. at 1182 (“The trial court’s conclusion that the permit denial 
was effectively a total taking of the property owner’s interest in 
these acres is fully supported in the record; there is no clear error 
in that conclusion.”).  As with the relevant parcel determination, 
FWS and Brittain County should argue that this is a legal con-
clusion, not a finding of fact.  Findings of fact like the value of the 
property may only be reviewable for clear error, but the determi-
nation that the Cordelia Lot has been deprived of economic value 
is a legal conclusion, they will argue, and it should accordingly be 
reviewed de novo. 
FWS and Brittain County may find other, more speculative, 
arguments regarding the financial value of the Cordelia Lot; how-
ever, the record does not disclose any evidence regarding other eco-
nomically productive uses, which should defeat any resort to them 
now.  See Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The government did not produce evidence 
indicating that Lost Tree could sell Plat 57 in such a condition.  
Speculative land uses are not considered as part of a takings in-
quiry.”); see also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934). 
VI. SAMPLE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGES 
These questions are suggested as a starting point.  Please feel free 
to develop your own. 
Issue 1: Whether the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce power 
• Brittain County 
o What sovereign interests does the ESA infringe on? 
o Isn’t the Tenth Amendment simply a “truism?” Or 
does the Tenth Amendment add something to your 
claim here beyond the limits imposed by Commerce 
Clause cases? 
• Lear 
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o Why shouldn’t we follow the long line of cases that 
hold the ESA is a constitutional exercise of the Com-
merce power? 
o Doesn’t the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer 
to pay $1,000 per year in rent for wildlife viewing 
demonstrate that there is some link to commerce 
here? 
o Doesn’t Raich indicate that Congress can regulate 
local activity so long as it is part of a class of activi-
ties that have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce? 
o Can the ESA be considered a regulation of the chan-
nels of interstate commerce? 
• FWS 
o Is justifying the ESA’s application to the Karner 
Blue with biodiversity consistent with Lopez and 
Morrison? 
o What effect on commerce does biodiversity have? 
Issue 2(a): Whether Lear’s takings claim is ripe without 
having applied for an ITP permit 
• Brittain County and FWS 
o What great certainty regarding the scope of the 
ESA’s burden on the Cordelia Lot could be achieved 
by requiring Lear to apply for an ITP? 
o Why should Lear have to apply for an ITP when the 
cost of meaningfully applying for it would be more 
than the fair market value of the Cordelia Lot? 
• Lear 
o Why should we treat Lear’s inquiry to the FWS as 
the equivalent of a permit application? 
o Why the futility exception be extended to situations 
where no formal permit application has been com-
pleted? 
Issue 2(b): Whether the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot 
or all of Lear Island 
• FWS and Brittain County 
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o Didn’t the district court determine a matter of fact 
that the relevant parcel is the Cordelia Lot? If so, 
isn’t it reviewable only for clear error? 
o Does the lack of unity of ownership here require a 
conclusion that the Cordelia Lot should be treated as 
the relevant parcel? 
 
• Lear 
o Lear Island was a single parcel of property for 150 
years, and was treated as a single parcel of property 
for another 40 years after that.  Why should it be 
treated separately now? 
o Does the fact that Lear came into possession of the 
property after the enactment of the ESA and Brit-
tain County Wetlands Preservation Law preclude 
her takings claim? 
Issue 2(c): Whether future developability based on natural 
destruction of the butterfly habitat precludes Lear’s 
takings claim 
• FWS and Brittain County 
o Doesn’t it seem incongruous to use the potential de-
struction of the Karner Blues’ habitat as a defense 
to takings claim? 
o Isn’t Lear’s inability to develop the Cordelia Lot for 
ten years essentially a permanent deprivation? 
o When should the permanence of a deprivation be de-
termined? 
o At what point does a temporary deprivation become 
a permanent one? 
• Lear 
o What is the harm in waiting ten years to construct a 
residence on the Cordelia Lot? 
o Didn’t the Tahoe-Sierra Court suggest that Lucas is 
never the appropriate vehicle for challenging a tem-
porary deprivation of economic value? 
Issue 2(d): Whether public trust doctrine principles 
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preclude Lear’s takings claim 
• FWS and Brittain County 
o Did navigability extend to Lake Union in 1803? 
o Why isn’t the 1803 congressional grant specific 
enough about providing title to the submerged 
marshlands? 
o Without a rule of state law, can we know what the 
scope of the public trust doctrine is in New Union?  
If not, shouldn’t we refrain from trying to predict it 
here? 
• Lear 
o Is the navigability of Lake Union a question of fed-
eral law or state law? 
o Does the 1803 congressional grant satisfy clearly in-
dicate a congressional intent to defeat a future 
state’s title to the lakebed of Lake Union? 
o Isn’t the public trust doctrine universal enough that 
we could consider its scope here? 
Issue 2(e)(1): Whether the ESA and the county wetlands 
regulation can be considered together for takings 
purposes 
• FWS and Brittain County 
o Don’t cases like Tahoe-Sierra and Agins v. City of Ti-
buron demonstrate that the Supreme Court is will-
ing to consider multiple laws together? 
o Environmental statutes frequently employ princi-
ples of cooperative federalism. Where the purpose of 
a regulatory regime is to have two levels of govern-
ment cooperate, doesn’t considering the regulations 
together seem appropriate? 
• Lear 
o Has any court considered a joint taking before? 
o Why shouldn’t we consider the diminution of the 
value of the Cordelia Lot to be a divisible injury? 
Issue 2(e)(2): Whether the butterfly society’s offer to pay 
$1,000 per year in rent for wildlife viewing defeats Lear’s 
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takings claim 
• FWS and Brittain County 
o Isn’t the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer, at 
most, just a “token interest?” 
o Does the fact that Lear’s property taxes are higher 
than what the butterfly society would pay require a 
conclusion that the Cordelia Lot has been deprived 
of all economic value? 
o Is the district court’s finding that the Cordelia Lot 
has been deprived of all economic value a finding of 
fact? In that case, can we only review it for clear er-
ror? 
• Lear 
o Is the district court’s finding that the Cordelia Lot 
been deprived of all economic value a finding of fact, 
or is it an application of law to fact that is reviewable 
de novo? 
o Isn’t this just a diminution in value of the sort the 
Supreme Court has held to be non-compensable? 
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ISSUES TABLES 
 
  
Summary of Parties’ Positions by Issue 
Issue Brittain 
County 
Lear FWS 
Is the ESA constitutional under 
the Commerce Clause?  
No No Yes 
Is Lear’s takings claim ripe even 
though she did not apply for an 
ITP?   
No Yes No 
For Lear’s takings claim, is the 
relevant parcel the entirety of 
Lear Island ore merely the Cor-
delia Lot?  
Lear Island Cordelia Lot Lear Island 
Does the fact that the Cordelia 
Lot will become developable 
upon the natural destruction of 
the butterfly habitat in 10 years 
preclude Lear’s takings claim? 
Yes No Yes 
Do public trust doctrine princi-
ples inherent in title preclude 
Lear’s claim for a taking?   
Yes No Yes 
Are FWS and Brittain County li-
able for a complete deprivation 
of the economic value of the Cor-
delia Lot when neither the ESA 
nor the county wetlands regula-
tion would, by itself, completely 
prohibit Lear from building a 
single-family residence? 
No Yes No 
Does the Brittain County Butter-
fly Society’s offer to pay $1,000 
per year in rent for wildlife view-
ing preclude a takings claim for 
complete loss of economic value?  
Yes No Yes 
51
  
2017] NELMCC BENCH MEMORANDUM 69 
 
Summary of Parties’ Procedural Postures by Issue 
Issue District 
Court 
Holding 
Brittain 
County Pos-
ture on Ap-
peal 
Lear Pos-
ture on Ap-
peal 
FWS 
Posture on 
Appeal 
ESA constitutional?  Yes. Appeals and 
argues no. 
Appeals and 
argues no. 
(Agrees with 
District 
Court) 
Takings claim ripe?   Yes. Appeals and 
argues no. 
(Agrees with 
District 
Court) 
Appeals and 
argues no. 
Relevant parcel?  The Cor-
delia 
Lot. 
Appeals and 
argues Lear 
Island is the 
relevant par-
cel 
(Agrees with 
District 
Court) 
Appeals and 
argues Lear 
Island is the 
relevant par-
cel 
Does developability upon natu-
ral destruction of the butterfly 
habitat in 10 years defeat 
Lear’s takings claim? 
No. Appeals and 
argues no 
(Agrees with 
District 
Court) 
Appeals and 
argues no 
Do public trust doctrine princi-
ples inherent in Lear’s title pre-
clude her takings claim? 
No. Appeals and 
argues no 
(Agrees with 
District 
Court) 
Appeals and 
argues no 
Are FWS and Brittain County 
liable for a total deprivation of 
economic value even though 
neither the ESA nor the county 
wetlands regulation, acting 
alone, would totally deprive the 
Cordelia Lot of economic value?  
Yes. Appeals and 
argues no 
(Agrees with 
District 
Court) 
Appeals and 
argues no 
Does the butterfly society’s offer 
to pay $1,000 per year in rent 
for wildlife viewing preclude a 
takings claim based on total 
deprivation of economic value?  
No. Appeals and 
argues no 
(Agrees with 
District 
Court) 
Appeals and 
argues no 
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